We are often asked about operations companies – “op-cos” in industry shorthand – the affiliated services organizations that private equity sponsors have built alongside their funds, staffed with operating professionals who parachute into portfolio companies to run pricing projects, stand up go-to-market functions, negotiate procurement, recruit executives and implement the 100-day plan. The portfolio companies pay for this. The arrangements are structured, deliberately, so that those payments do not reduce the management fee. Twenty years ago, this was an exotic feature of a handful of large platforms. Today, many sponsors of scale have one, are building one or are being asked in diligence if such plans exist – and, from the other side of the table, investors are asking a question of their own, which is some version of: Aren’t we already paying for this?
Both questions deserve serious answers, and this primer is our attempt at them. First, a scope note, because the vocabulary here is a mess. The market uses “operating partners,” “portfolio operations,” “value creation team,” “in-house consulting group” and “op-co” almost interchangeably, and the labels obscure the distinctions that matter. In this post, our subject is the arrangement in which an affiliated services organization – whatever it is called and wherever its people formally sit – provides services to portfolio companies for compensation borne by those companies, structured so that the compensation does not offset the management fee. A sponsor whose operating professionals are ordinary employees of the management company, funded entirely by the management fee and free to the portfolio, is running an operating team but not, in our sense, an op-co. The questions in this primer mostly do not reach that model, which is also – a point we develop below – the prevailing model in venture capital. The questions arrive the moment the invoice does.
A second scope note and really the thesis of this primer: The op-co is not a stand-alone innovation. It is the place where the industry’s two great 20-year trends collide. The first trend is the operational turn – the migration of private equity’s value creation story from financial engineering to operations, to the point where the operating capability is the product being sold in fundraising. The second is the great fee squeeze – headline rates drifting down, step-downs arriving sooner, offsets marching to 100%, organizational caps tightening – which has left the management company budget carrying ever-grander promises on an ever-thinner base. The op-co sits precisely at the intersection: It is how the operational promise gets funded when the fee no longer can, or no longer will. And, because the money that used to travel from portfolio companies to sponsors under older names – monitoring fees, most famously – was chased down and offset into near extinction by a decade of investor pressure, regulatory attention and redrafted agreements, the op-co is also, less charitably, where that money learned to travel under a new name. Both descriptions are true. The whole subject lives in the space between them.
At a high level, three questions determine almost everything about whether a particular op-co arrangement is sound:
- Would the company buy this service anyway – at this price, from a stranger? If the answer is yes, the sponsor is capturing spend that would otherwise leak to outside consultants, and doing so with better knowledge, faster deployment and, often, a lower rate. If the answer is no, the portfolio is buying something because its controlling shareholder told it to, at a price its controlling shareholder set – and every hard question in this primer follows from that.
- Who ultimately bears the cost and compared to what? The entire debate, stripped of its vocabulary, is an argument about counterfactuals – whether the honest alternative to the op-co invoice is the management fee absorbing the cost, the fund bearing it as an expense, an outside firm charging more or the service not being bought at all. We will put numbers on this below, because the numbers make the argument tractable.
- Was it sold once or twice? The fundraising deck that presents the operating platform as the sponsor’s edge – the reason to pay this manager a fee in the first place – and accordingly has made a representation about what the fee buys. An arrangement under which the portfolio then pays separately for that same platform has to be reconciled with that representation, in writing, in advance. Most of the genuine grievances in this corner of the market are, at bottom, reconciliation failures.
These questions are related, but they are not the same. An op-co can pass the stranger test and still have been sold twice. We will build up to all three, but first, some terminology.
A note on terminology
A few terms recur throughout this post and carry more weight than their plainness suggests.
An operating partner (or operating professional, operating executive or – in an older and now disfavored usage – consultant) is a person whose job is improving portfolio companies rather than sourcing and executing investments. A portfolio operations team or value creation team is the collection of such people; an op-co is a distinct affiliated entity that houses them – sometimes a subsidiary of the management company, sometimes a sister entity under common ownership – and contracts with portfolio companies for their services.
Monitoring fees are the ancestor species: recurring fees paid by portfolio companies to the sponsor for board-level oversight and general advisory attention – for, roughly, the sponsor doing its job as an owner. Transaction fees are their event-driven cousins, charged at acquisitions, financings and exits. Both were once significant sponsor revenue lines; both are now, in new funds, almost universally subject to full offset, for reasons the history section explains.
The management fee offset is the limited partner agreement (LPA) provision that reduces the management fee by some percentage of specified fee income the sponsor and its affiliates receive from portfolio companies. The offset has two moving parts, and all of the action is in the second. The first is the percentage – once commonly 50% or 80%, now 100% as the institutional standard. The second is the definition of the fee income to which the percentage applies: which categories are captured (transaction, monitoring, break-up, directors’ fees) and which are carved out. An excluded fee or offset carve-out is a category drafted outside the definition – and fees for services rendered by the sponsor’s operating professionals or affiliated service entities, typically qualified by a requirement that rates not exceed market, are the modern market’s most consequential carve-out.
A related party or affiliate is defined by the LPA, and the definition does load-bearing work: An offset that captures fees paid to “the Manager and its Affiliates” reaches exactly as far as “Affiliate” reaches, a boundary this market has litigated in every sense but the courtroom. Arm’s length and market rate are the standards to which affiliated pricing is held; a cost-recovery (or cost-reimbursement) model charges portfolio companies the allocated cost of services with no margin, while a cost-plus or market-rate model includes one. A secondment places an operating professional inside a portfolio company, on its premises and often its payroll, for a defined period – the purest form of the airdrop. The paper behind all of it is usually a master services agreement (MSA) – an umbrella contract between the op-co and the portfolio company under which individual engagements are scoped by statements of work. The MSA’s breadth, and the statements of the work’s specificity (or absence), are where the pricing and accountability questions in this primer become contract terms – or fail to.
Finally, the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) fee reporting template is the institutional market’s standardized disclosure of fees, offsets and fee income received from portfolio investments, related parties included; its line items are where op-co economics become visible to investors, or don’t. (For the management fee itself – bases, rates, step-downs – see our primer on management fees; for how individual investors negotiate fee visibility and protections, see our primer on side letters.)
How we got here
The history matters, because the op-co inherits the reputation of its ancestors, fairly or not, and because the pattern of the last cycle is the best predictor of the next one.
Begin with the operational turn. In the industry’s early decades, returns were substantially a financial engineering story – leverage, multiple arbitrage, tax efficiency – and the sponsor’s post-closing involvement was board oversight. That world is gone. By most serious attributions, operational improvement now accounts for something approaching half of buyout value creation, up from less than a fifth in the 1980s, while financial engineering’s share has fallen by half. The operating capability moved from appendix to pitch: Sponsors now raise funds on the strength of named operating benches, codified playbooks and full-time functional specialists in pricing, digital, talent and procurement. Investors reward it – they diligence operating teams the way they once diligenced track records – and companies, by and large, value it. Nothing in this primer should be read as skepticism of the capability itself. The capability is real, expensive and frequently decisive.
Now the money. Through the 2000s, the sponsor’s operating involvement was often monetized directly: monitoring agreements obligating portfolio companies to pay annual fees for oversight, transaction fees at every event, and – at some firms – consulting arrangements whose economics investors could not see. The arrangement had a structural vulnerability that a famous 2014 speech by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s then-head of examinations made unavoidable: The sponsor controls the company that pays. In the speech’s memorable framing, the adviser can instruct a portfolio company it controls to hire the adviser, or an affiliate, or a preferred third party – and set the terms of the engagement, including the price. The same speech reported that more than half of the private equity managers then examined showed violations or material weaknesses around fees and expenses, identified the industry’s use of operating consultants – promoted as team members, paid by portfolio companies or funds without adequate disclosure – as among the most common deficiencies, and characterized the resulting economics as a back-door fee investors did not expect. A wave of enforcement settlements followed over the next three years, and the fact patterns read like a syllabus for this primer: undisclosed acceleration of monitoring fees at exit; broken-deal expenses allocated to funds while co-investing insiders rode free; and portfolio company service fees routed to an affiliated consulting firm staffed largely by the same people who worked at the manager, without offset and without adequate disclosure. The fines were modest by industry standards. The redrafting they triggered was not.
The academic record filled in what the enforcement record sampled. Researchers who assembled portfolio company fee data at scale found the arrangements resting on master services agreements drafted, in their description, with deliberate vagueness – umbrella contracts under which fees flowed for services defined loosely enough that neither the amount nor the deliverable could be tested against anything – and documented fact patterns in which the service fees collected from a company across a holding period rivaled or exceeded what investors ultimately received from the deal, including, most famously, around one celebrated bankruptcy in which the companies’ payments to their sponsors survived the equity that did not.
The point of retelling this is not that the modern op-co is that arrangement; mostly, it is not, and the distance between them is precisely the reforms this primer describes. The point is that investors’ institutional memory contains all of it, that the vocabulary of the defense – services, fairly priced, that the companies needed – has been used before in fact patterns that did not survive scrutiny, and that a sponsor building the modern version should understand it is drafting against that memory.
Investors, armed with the examinations record and organized behind institutional guidance, ran the offset percentage to 100 and widened the definitions. The leading investor association’s principles now state the position at its logical limit: Ideally no fees charged to portfolio companies at all. If charged, 100% offset; exemptions rare and clearly defined; non-offset fees disclosed; fees generated by any affiliate of the sponsor – expressly including an in-house consultancy, whether charging the fund or a portfolio company – reviewed and approved by the advisory committee; and portfolio company fees that escape the offset rebated to investors at the end of the fund’s life. Under that pressure, the monitoring fee died in new institutional funds, and the transaction fee mostly followed. But the operational turn was accelerating at exactly the same time, and the cost of the operating capability was landing somewhere. The market’s answer was to move the economics from fees for oversight – indefensible, since oversight is what the management fee buys – to fees for services: discrete, scoped, deliverable-based engagements that a company could, in principle, have bought from an outside firm. The offset clause, having conquered the old categories, met a new one drafted to sit outside it. The same investor association’s own market intelligence now records the result in one sentence: The offset concept has been eroded by exclusions for fees paid to so-called operating partners and other affiliated service arrangements, leaving investors to wrestle with the distinction between services a sponsor is expected to provide for the management fee and services that are genuinely incremental. That sentence is this primer’s entire subject, stated by the party paying.
One more piece of history, because the market has already run the full experiment on the boundary question. The most closely watched consulting affiliate in the industry spent years positioned – with the support of formal legal opinion, resting on control-factor analysis – as not an affiliate of its sponsor, with the consequence that a decade of consulting fees largely escaped offset provisions that captured affiliate fee income. Investigative reporting in 2014 made the arrangement famous; investor pressure and time did the rest. Today, the same sponsor’s own public materials describe the same organization, without ceremony, as an affiliate. The episode is worth knowing not for the names – our drafting notes have them – but for the moral: The perimeter question gets answered eventually, the answer has so far always moved in one direction, and a structure whose economics depend on a contestable answer to “is this thing yours?” is a structure with a half-life. Modern LPA affiliate definitions, and disclosure standards that deliberately reach beyond formal affiliation, were drafted by people who remember.
Why this is happening now
The history explains the shape of the op-co; the last five years explain its ubiquity, and the drivers are worth stating plainly because they are the sponsor’s honest case.
The capability became the product.
When operational improvement drives half the value creation and every fundraising deck leads with the operating platform, a thin bench is a competitive disability. Investors ask to meet the operating team; diligence questionnaires ask for its headcount, tenure and attribution; and the operating model has become a stated reason capital chooses one manager over another. Having promised the capability, the sponsor must build it.
The fee cannot carry what the deck promised.
Meanwhile, the budget that would traditionally fund that build has been compressing from every direction: Mean management fee rates on recent vintages sit meaningfully below the folkloric 2%, step-downs arrive at the investment period’s end, offsets at 100% have eliminated the old subsidy lines, and organizational caps and expense scrutiny police the edges. Against that base, consider what the operating bench costs. Senior operating professionals at scale now command cash compensation in the high six figures to seven figures, with carried interest participation increasingly expected. The market has correctly concluded that operators who create value want to be paid like people who create value. A credible 20-person bench is a payroll in the eight figures, every year, before travel, systems and the playbook infrastructure around it. At the largest platforms, the management company absorbs this, and the question is margin. In the mid-market, the arithmetic frequently does not work at all: The fee that must also fund the investment team, the back office, compliance and the office lease simply cannot add an eight-figure operating bench. The op-co converts that impossible fixed cost into a variable cost borne where the work lands.
The platform’s argument, stated fairly.
All of this culminates in a specific ask that sponsors now make of their investors, and it deserves to be understood rather than caricatured. Start with the sponsor’s arithmetic. If operating services fees are subject to a full offset, billing the portfolio accomplishes nothing: Every dollar a portfolio company pays the operating team reduces the management fee by the same dollar, so the team’s cost still lands on the sponsor’s own budget. And a sponsor funding the team out of its own pocket will build the smallest team it can defend. Not stinginess; arithmetic. Hence the ask: Carve operating services fees out of the offset, hold the pricing to cost or demonstrably below-market rates, and let the portfolio, rather than the fee, fund the platform. That will fairly allow co-investors to pay their share, and more importantly, freed of that constraint, the sponsor says, we will build the real thing – more specialists, deeper playbooks, faster deployment – and your companies will get a whole lot more than a fee-funded team could ever provide. The argument has genuine economic content: The offset does not merely decide who pays for the operating platform; at the margin, it decides how much platform exists at all. The investor’s rejoinder writes itself – then the fee was mispriced against the promises – but the sponsor’s argument is not a pretext, and treating it as one is how these negotiations go sideways. The worked example below puts numbers on all of it.
And the quiet driver: The counterfactual is not zero.
Portfolio companies buy operational help regardless. They engage strategy consultancies, executive recruiters, pricing specialists and system integrators at full market rates, chosen engagement by engagement, with no accumulated knowledge of the company and no equity alignment whatsoever. The op-co’s most defensible framing has always been substitution: The spend exists. The only questions are who captures it, at what rate and with what quality. Whether that framing describes any particular arrangement is an evidentiary question – which is exactly why the drafting and disclosure sections below insist on evidence.
A worked example, because the numbers make the argument honest
Take a $1 billion fund paying a 2% management fee – $20 million a year during the investment period – and a sponsor whose operating bench of 20 professionals costs $12 million a year, fully loaded. Walk the worlds.
World A: The fee funds the team
The management company absorbs the $12 million. Investors’ all-in cost is the $20 million fee. The operating team consumes 60% of the fee before a single investment professional is paid – which is the world’s entire problem, and why, outside the largest platforms, World A produces small teams.
World B: The portfolio is billed, with a 100% offset
Portfolio companies pay $12 million for services; the management fee falls to $8 million. The sponsor grosses the same $20 million, bears the same $12 million of cost and nets the same $8 million as World A. Investors bear the same $20 million – $8 million as fee, $12 million inside portfolio company profits and losses (P&L). World B is World A with extra invoices. This is the arithmetic behind the sponsor’s argument above: Under a full offset, billing is pointless, so the offset functions as a decision not to have the portfolio fund the platform – which is a perfectly coherent decision, so long as everyone understands that it is the decision being made.
World C: The op-co bills at cost, no offset
Portfolio companies pay $12 million; the fee stays $20 million. The sponsor’s platform is now $12 million better funded than in World A – that is the entire point – and investors’ all-in cost is $32 million. The sponsor’s case for World C is the substitution argument: The companies would have spent that $12 million (or more) on outsiders anyway, so investor cost has not increased against the true counterfactual; it has merely been captured, at cost, by a better-informed provider. The investor’s case against World C is the reconciliation argument: The deck said the platform was what the premium fee bought.
World D: The op-co bills at “market,” no offset
Same as World C, but at, say, $15 million – cost plus a margin defended as below what outside firms charge. Investor all-in: $35 million. The sponsor now earns a services profit on top of the fee, and every question in this primer arrives at once.
World E: The outsiders
Portfolio companies buy the same services from third-party firms at $15 million or more. Investor all-in: $35 million+, the margin leaves the family, and nobody’s LPA says a word about it – a fact worth sitting with, because it means the visibility of op-co economics, not their existence, is what triggers the scrutiny.
The negotiation between sponsor and investor is, at bottom, an argument about which world is the honest baseline. The sponsor compares World D to World E and calls the op-co a bargain. The investor compares World C to World A and calls it double-charging. Both comparisons are internally valid. The LPA’s job – the offset definition, the pricing covenant, the disclosure regime – is to decide which comparison governs, in writing, before the invoices exist. Everything in the next three sections is machinery for doing that well.
Why investors say yes – and when they say no
Start with why sophisticated institutions, that wrote the 100% offset into the market, nonetheless accept op-co arrangements every week. They say yes when the capability is real and they wanted it – when they diligenced the operating bench, scored it and allocated partly because of it. They say yes more readily to cost-recovery pricing, which concedes the sponsor’s funding problem while surrendering the profit objection. A sponsor recovering allocated cost with no margin is asking the portfolio to fund a capability, not buying itself a second revenue line. They say yes when the disclosure is real – engagement-level economics visible in the standardized reporting line items, budgets shared, the rate card benchmarked against third-party quotes – and when the advisory committee saw the framework before the first invoice rather than after the first grievance. And they say yes, candidly, because the alternative they most fear is not World C; it is a mid-market sponsor in World A with a two-person operating “team” and a deck full of promises.
One audience deserves separate mention, because the op-co reaches it by a route it thought it had closed: co-investors and other company-level minority holders. An institution that negotiated a no-fee, no-carry co-investment has escaped the fund’s fee stack – and then encounters the op-co at the portfolio company’s P&L, where the services invoice dilutes every shareholder ratably, side letters notwithstanding. Sophisticated co-investors have learned to read the master services agreement in diligence, to ask for the rate card and historical charges, and increasingly to negotiate company-level protections – caps, approval rights over affiliate engagements above thresholds, audit access – in the shareholders’ agreement, which is the only document that actually governs their exposure. Cross-fund fairness runs on the same track: Where two funds, or a fund and a continuation vehicle, hold the same company, the op-co’s charges are borne by whoever owns the P&L, and the allocation deserves the same discipline as any other cross-fund cost. Sponsors should assume that every constituency that cannot see the offset clause will eventually ask what the offset clause never protected them from anyway.
They say no – or extract a price – on a shorter and sharper list. It was sold twice: The fundraising materials presented the platform as included in the fee, and the portfolio was billed for it anyway; no drafting survives that fact pattern gracefully, which is why consistency across deck, DDQ, Form ADV and LPA is the first item in our practical observations. The seller controls the buyer: The price was set by a sponsor negotiating with itself – the same both-sides geometry that organizes continuation fund conflicts, one level down the structure chart – and nothing in the file shows the price was tested. The margin is opaque: Investors who cannot tell cost recovery from profit center assume the worse answer, rationally. The erosion precedent: Institutions remember that the last generation of portfolio company fees was also defended as services fairly priced, and they read the offset carve-out as the same movie recast. The sponsor who acknowledges that history, rather than treating the skepticism as ignorance, negotiates from higher ground. And beneath all of it sits the line the investor community itself has drawn: the distinction between services a sponsor should be expected to provide for the management fee – strategy, oversight, board work, the ordinary attention of an owner – and services that are genuinely incremental, specialized and elective. Every op-co negotiation is really an argument about where particular services fall on that line, and the sponsors who do this well arrive with the line already drawn, service by service, in the documents.
The structural menu: Subsidiary, sibling or something else
Now the entity chart – because clients ask about it constantly and because it is widely misunderstood: Sponsors reach for different structures for legitimate operational reasons, and no structure answers the offset question by itself.
Operating professionals inside the manager
The simplest model: Operators are employees of the management company alongside the investment team. If their services are billed to portfolio companies, the fees are unambiguously affiliate fee income, and the offset analysis is met head-on in the LPA – carve-out or no carve-out, negotiated in the open. Many sponsors in this model simply do not bill and fund the team from the fee: World A, with its budget consequences.
The wholly owned subsidiary op-co
The flagship archetype: A distinct entity, owned by the management company or its parent, that employs the operating professionals and contracts with portfolio companies. The legitimate drivers are real and mostly have nothing to do with offsets. A separate employer entity cleanly separates payroll, benefits design and compensation culture. Operating professionals are typically compensated on salary, bonus and sometimes portfolio company equity, on a different architecture than the investment team’s carry-centric model, and housing them separately avoids a hundred small frictions (for how the investment side’s economics are built, see our primer on structuring the general partner and management company). It contains employment law and co-employment exposure that comes with seconding people into portfolio companies. It isolates professional services liability – an operator’s negligent advice becomes a claim against the services entity, not the investment adviser. It simplifies state registrations, insurance and, sometimes, non-US employment. What the wholly owned subsidiary does not do is move the fees outside the offset by itself: It is an affiliate under any modern definition, and its economics are disclosed as related-party economics. It is, for exactly that reason, the honest structure – the entity chart serves operations, and the offset outcome is negotiated on its merits in the LPA.
The sibling entity
The aggressive end of the menu: An operations business owned not by the management company but in parallel – by the principals, or by a subset of them – with the historical purpose, among others, of supporting an argument that it is not an “affiliate” whose fees the offset captures. We will be direct about this one: The market has run the experiment, the best-known version of it ended with the entity inside the perimeter, and the drafting has adapted. Modern institutional LPAs define affiliates by control and common control rather than by shareholding formalities; institutional guidance expressly demands disclosure of fee income on a standard that exceeds formal related-party definitions; and diligence questionnaires now ask the question in words that leave no room (“Do the principals or any of their affiliates hold interests in any entity that provides services to portfolio companies?”). A sibling structure adopted for genuine reasons – regulatory separation, joint ventures with outside operating executives, businesses that serve non-portfolio clients too – remains available and defensible with disclosure. A sibling structure adopted to manufacture the offset answer is a diligence finding waiting to be written up.
Preferred third parties and senior advisor networks
Beyond the perimeter sit the true independents: consulting firms, senior advisors and executive networks that are not affiliates at all but that the sponsor repeatedly installs. No offset logically applies – the sponsor earns nothing – but the conflicts do not vanish: The sponsor still directs a controlled company’s spending toward its chosen providers, sometimes providers with informal economic ties to the sponsor’s ecosystem, and disclosure practice has followed the same arc as everything else in this primer. The sponsor’s own documents increasingly acknowledge the conflict in plain terms, because the alternative – an examiner explaining it first – has been tried.
Two closing notes on structure. First, benefit plan and employment questions (retirement plan design across commonly controlled entities, secondment mechanics, co-employment) have real technical content that varies with facts. This is bring-your-employment-and-benefits-counsel territory, and the entity chart should be drawn with them in the room, not presented to them afterward. Second, and worth emphasis: Structure follows employment and liability logic legitimately; it cannot honestly manufacture the offset answer. That answer lives in the LPA’s definitions and the disclosure documents, wherever the people sit.
Drafting the deal: The offset clause meets the op-co
This brings us to the drafting, where the commercial bargain becomes enforceable or evaporates. The modern offset provision has a stable anatomy: a defined term capturing fee income – transaction, monitoring, break-up, directors’ and “similar” fees received by the manager and its affiliates from portfolio companies – offset at 100% against the management fee; and a carve-out for the op-co, typically some variant of fees and expense reimbursements for operational, consulting or similar services provided by operating professionals or affiliated service entities, at rates not in excess of market rates for comparable services. Everything worth negotiating lives in and around that carve-out, and the market has developed a recognizable menu.
The pricing covenant
“Market rate” is the floor of respectability, not the ceiling of protection. The investor-side improvements, in ascending order of strength: a benchmarking obligation (rates supported by third-party comparables, refreshed periodically); a cost-plus cap (margin not to exceed a stated percentage); and the clean answer, cost recovery only – allocated cost, no margin, sometimes with an agreed methodology for what “cost” loads. Cost recovery deserves its reputation as the peace treaty: It funds the platform, defeats the profit-center critique, and converts the remaining questions into allocation and disclosure questions, which are answerable.
The definitional hygiene
The carve-out should be a list, not a vibe: which service categories are excluded from offset (functional consulting, executive search, procurement programs, technology implementation), which are expressly not excluded (anything resembling oversight, board service, deal work – the things the management fee already buys), and a mechanism for the unlisted. The sponsor who accepts precision here is buying itself the ability to say, years later, that the line investors themselves drew – fee-covered services versus incremental services – was drawn in the documents, service by service, before the first engagement.
The governance and disclosure package
Advisory committee review of the op-co framework – rate card, allocation methodology, material changes – tracks the institutional guidance and is cheap insurance. Some sponsors add annual op-co reporting (revenue by portfolio company, aggregate margin if any, benchmarking refresh) delivered with the standardized fee template, whose line items exist for exactly this. Side letter dynamics follow the usual physics – fee visibility and reporting asks propagate through most-favored-nation provisions in the ordinary way (see our primer on side letters) – and a sponsor should assume the most demanding investor’s disclosure package will become the de facto standard for the base.
The residuals and edge cases
The institutional principles ask that non-offset portfolio company fees be rebated to investors at the fund’s end of life; sponsors resist, and the compromise is usually disclosure plus the pricing covenant rather than a rebate. Cross-fund allocation deserves a sentence in the documents (when the op-co serves a company held by two funds, or a fund and co-investors, cost follows ownership). And the portfolio company side of the contract is not decoration: An op-co services agreement is a related-party contract at the company level, which means board process, disinterested approval where the governance provides for it, and attention to the minority holders and co-investors who will read the master services agreement with exactly the skepticism this primer has been teaching.
The venture contrast
Venture’s version of the operating platform – the talent team, marketing and communications bench, business development, and the platform function generally – is overwhelmingly funded by the management fee and provided free to portfolio companies, and the structural reasons are instructive rather than accidental. Minority positions confer no power to direct company spending, so the control conflict that animates this primer mostly cannot arise. Early-stage companies have no earnings to bill against, and every dollar invoiced to a seed-stage company is a dollar of the fund’s own capital making a round trip through a services contract – an arrangement that flatters no one’s economics and would be priced accordingly by the next round’s investors. And the platform is a competitive weapon in winning allocations: Free, excellent services are part of how venture firms persuade founders to take their money over someone else’s, which arguing over invoices would blunt. Venture’s fight over these costs therefore happens inside the fee-and-expense negotiation – how large a platform the management fee should fund and what belongs in the fund’s expense provisions – rather than at the portfolio company’s accounts payable (see our primer on management fees).
The exceptions are real but narrow, and practice varies: Some firms charge portfolio companies placement-style fees for executive recruiting; venture studio and incubation models make the services entity part of the investment thesis itself, with economics disclosed to investors as such; and the occasional platform service with hard third-party costs gets passed through at cost. Each of these lives comfortably inside the framework of this primer – scoped, priced, disclosed – precisely because it is exceptional. But the boundary is moving: Growth-stage firms with control or near-control positions in revenue-generating companies have begun importing the private equity model, and a venture-adjacent sponsor considering it should assume every question in this primer arrives with the first invoice, plus one more that has no buyout analog. Founders talk to each other constantly, and a platform that becomes a billing operation will hear about it in its next competitive deal, at the moment it can least afford to.
Does it actually add value?
The fair answer is: often yes, sometimes decisively and almost never probably in the way the debate demands. The attribution studies supporting the operational turn are aggregate; they establish that operational improvement drives returns, not that any particular sponsor’s op-co drives any particular company’s improvement. So the burden of proof has settled, correctly, on the sponsor, and the sponsors who carry it well have converged on the same evidentiary kit: engagement letters with scopes and deliverables rather than open-ended attention; rate cards benchmarked against real third-party quotes; before-and-after operating metrics for signature engagements; and – the item diligence teams weight most – portfolio company chief executives who volunteer, unscripted, that they would hire the op-co if they owned the company outright. That last one is the stranger test administered by its ideal proctor. A sponsor whose companies would not rehire its op-co at its rates has learned something the fee structure was hiding; a sponsor whose companies request more capacity than the op-co can staff has the only defense of the model that has ever fully persuaded anyone.
The regulatory map, in plain English
The regulatory frame here is short, because it is the same frame that governs every affiliated transaction in this industry, applied to a services contract. The Investment Advisers Act’s fiduciary duty and anti-fraud provisions – binding on registered and exempt advisers alike – require full and fair disclosure of conflicts. An adviser causing a controlled portfolio company to hire the adviser’s own affiliate, at a price the adviser influences, is the textbook conflict; the examinations chief’s 2014 formulation of it has been quoted in the industry ever since, including earlier in this primer. The enforcement actions of the mid-2010s punished, in essence, the gap between practice and paper – fees collected in structures the disclosures not described, offsets not honored, expenses shifted without consent. The durable lesson is that the cases were disclosure cases: The conduct that survived was the conduct described in advance.
Practice adapted accordingly; the modern sponsor’s Form ADV and fund documents describe the op-co, its ownership, its pricing basis and its offset treatment with a specificity that would have startled a 2013 drafting lawyer, and that specificity is the compliance program. The purpose-built private fund rules adopted in 2023 and vacated whole in 2024 would have added process around some of this; their disappearance changed the paperwork, not the baseline. Examination attention to fees, expenses, conflicts, disclosures and related-party arrangements persists as a standing theme regardless of how any year’s priorities letter is organized. Exempt reporting advisers carry the same fiduciary and anti-fraud baseline with a lighter formal overlay – relevant to the venture end of this primer’s audience mostly because the fee-funded platform model keeps them out of the blast radius entirely. And one housekeeping point: The op-co’s own regulatory character deserves a look in each case – a services entity is generally not itself an investment adviser, but the analysis belongs on the checklist, as do state law, employment and insurance questions that come with putting its people inside operating companies.
Practical market observations
Pulling the threads together, a few observations from the field.
The stranger test is the whole game, and it is administered whether or not the sponsor schedules it. Would this company buy this service, at this price, from a provider its owner did not control? Build only the op-co that survives the question, price it so the question is easy and collect the evidence – benchmarks, scopes, outcomes, references – as you go, because the question will be asked by an investor, examiner, minority co-investor or a successor management team, and the file you have is the answer you get.
Don’t sell it twice. The deck, the DDQ, the Form ADV, the LPA and the invoice must tell one story about what the management fee buys and what the portfolio pays for separately. Most op-co grievances are not really about money; they are about an investor discovering that the platform they thought they were paying for through the fee was also being paid for by their companies. That discovery is entirely preventable, and only in advance.
Cost recovery is the peace treaty, and mid-market sponsors especially should think hard before fighting for margin instead. The margin is rarely large enough to justify what it costs in trust, negotiation friction and diligence findings; the funded platform was the point, and cost recovery delivers it.
Design the entity for employment and liability; negotiate the offset on its merits. The subsidiary op-co earns its keep through payroll separation, benefits architecture, secondment mechanics and liability containment. It does not earn an offset answer, and structures built to manufacture one are betting against the documented direction of the market’s travel.
Disclose by name and by number. The standardized fee template has line items for related-party fee income because investors asked for them; a sponsor that populates them voluntarily, benchmarks annually and walks the advisory committee through the rate card has converted its op-co from a diligence risk into a diligence exhibit. Sunlight here is not just the legal strategy; it is the commercial one. The history of this corner of the market is a history of things that were fine until they were found.
Expect the arms race to continue. The offset clause chased the monitoring fee to extinction; the investor community has already named the operating services carve-out as the erosion it is watching; and drafting responds to conduct with a lag of about one fund cycle. A margin-heavy, opacity-dependent op-co is a clause-writing campaign in waiting. Build the version of the model that survives its own discovery, because everything in this market is eventually discovered.
And in venture, keep the platform inside the fee unless control economics genuinely justify otherwise – then treat the exception with all the machinery above. Neither billing the portfolio nor absorbing the cost is inherently right or wrong; undisclosed, unpriced and unconsidered arrangements are.
Conclusion
The op-co is the operational turn’s invoice, and the industry is still negotiating who pays it. That negotiation is legitimate on both sides: The capability is real and expensive, the fee base genuinely cannot always carry it, and the portfolio genuinely does buy these services from someone. Equally, the management fee was sold against a set of promises, the sponsor controls the counterparty on every engagement, and this market has been fooled before by fees wearing service costumes. The instruments for resolving all of this exist and are not exotic – a precise carve-out, honest price, governance touchpoint and disclosure that names numbers.
The questions, in the end, are the ones we opened with. Would the company buy this, at this price, from a stranger – and can you prove it? Who bears the cost, against which honest counterfactual? And was the platform sold once, or twice? These questions are related, but they are not the same – and the sponsors who thrive with this model are the ones who treat them not as diligence hazards to be survived but as the design brief. Because for the investors and companies on the other side of the invoice, that is exactly what they are.
The authors
